Systematic low bids
Systematic €1 bidding detected across 2 blocks
EUR 1.0/MW/h · 4 MW · 3 visible bids
00:00 - 04:00 · 12:00 - 16:00
Open-data desk
Reserve Merit Order
A public view of Regelleistung anonymous reserve publications, treated honestly as awarded-side stack data rather than a full rejected-tail order book.
This is the useful middle ground: the reserve leg is not flat, but the right story is still about the awarded margin and opportunity cost, not about pretending we can see the whole tender book.
Source: Regelleistung anonymous reserve offers. · Important: the public publication is only shown up to the awarded amount, so the rejected tail is not visible. · Auction design matters too: FCR capacity is uniform-price/pay-as-cleared, while aFRR and mFRR capacity are pay-as-bid. · Selected leg: aFRR capacity · Positive reserve.
Accepted stack explorer
Product
Direction
Open-data awarded-side stack ready
Current read
Awarded-side prices are competitive
Ask what the awarded side is saying and which stories remain unavailable because the rejected anonymous tail is hidden.
Average marginal price
EUR 12.0/MW/h
Mean marginal price across the visible awarded-side blocks in scope.
Visible stack multiple
1.00x
Published offered MW divided by awarded MW. This is a publication-window ratio, not the true full-book depth.
Accepted volume
13,648 MW
The awarded-side chart clears 13,648 MW across 6 blocks. Public files still show 13,683 MW offered inside the visible publication window.
Highest visible margin
16:00 - 20:00 · EUR 34.2/MW/h
The public file ends almost exactly at the awarded amount. That does not prove scarcity; it mostly reflects the awarded-side truncation of the anonymous data.
Published acceptance rate
99.8%
Awarded MW divided by published offered MW. Because the rejected tail is hidden, this is not the full tender acceptance rate.
Visibility note
The public window is narrow
Most blocks terminate close to the awarded amount, so the public publication is best treated as an awarded-side stack rather than a full merit curve.
Pricing design
Pricing rule is not the same thing as the merit order
Regelleistung currently settles FCR capacity pay-as-cleared, while aFRR and mFRR capacity settle pay-as-bid. That changes how rents are distributed and how bidders shade offers, but it does not remove the underlying scarcity ordering or the role of marginal activation lists in balancing energy.
FRR comparison
Compare the four FRR legs
Read `aFRR+`, `aFRR-`, `mFRR+`, and `mFRR-` together. The interesting question is often not one leg in isolation, but which side of flexibility is cheap or expensive on the same day.
Blocks
Choose an awarded-side block
Each block is an actual anonymous publication window up to the awarded amount. Click into the block where the awarded margin looks most interesting.
Selected curve
16:00 - 20:00 awarded-side stack
The public file ends almost exactly at the awarded amount. That does not prove scarcity; it mostly reflects the awarded-side truncation of the anonymous data.
awarded-side bids shown
Block details
EUR 34.2/MW/h
Average visible bid price EUR 17.3/MW/h
Visible range EUR 5.9/MW/h to EUR 34.2/MW/h
Published stack shape
Awarded 2,332 MW
Published offered 2,342 MW
1.00x published / awarded
99.6% awarded inside publication window
Largest visible country bucket DE
At the margin
DEawarded
EUR 33.0/MW/h
5 MW published · 5 MW awarded
DEawarded
EUR 33.4/MW/h
5 MW published · 5 MW awarded
DEawarded edge
EUR 34.2/MW/h
5 MW published · 1 MW awarded
Country mix
Visible country buckets in 16:00 - 20:00
DE
79.2% of visible offered MW
1,854 MW published · 1,850 MW awarded
AT
13.2% of visible offered MW
310 MW published · 305 MW awarded
CZ
7.6% of visible offered MW
178 MW published · 177 MW awarded
Patterns
Repeated price structures
Systematic low bids
Systematic €2 bidding detected across 5 blocks
EUR 2.0/MW/h · 4 MW · 147 visible bids
00:00 - 04:00 · 04:00 - 08:00 · 08:00 - 12:00 · 12:00 - 16:00 · 20:00 - 00:00
Systematic low bids
Systematic €3 bidding detected across 4 blocks
EUR 3.0/MW/h · 4 MW · 623 visible bids
00:00 - 04:00 · 04:00 - 08:00 · 12:00 - 16:00 · 20:00 - 00:00
Systematic low bids
Systematic €4 bidding detected across 5 blocks
EUR 4.0/MW/h · 4 MW · 515 visible bids
00:00 - 04:00 · 04:00 - 08:00 · 08:00 - 12:00 · 12:00 - 16:00 · 20:00 - 00:00
Systematic low bids
Systematic €5 bidding detected across 3 blocks
EUR 5.0/MW/h · 4 MW · 695 visible bids
04:00 - 08:00 · 08:00 - 12:00 · 20:00 - 00:00
Systematic low bids
Systematic €6 bidding detected across 4 blocks
EUR 6.0/MW/h · 5 MW · 568 visible bids
04:00 - 08:00 · 08:00 - 12:00 · 16:00 - 20:00 · 20:00 - 00:00
Energy-side bridge
What the day-ahead side was doing in this block
Prices
Actual DA avg 142.6 EUR/MWh
Benchmark DA avg 46.0 EUR/MWh
Open fundamentals
Residual load 34,116 MW
Solar 2,396 MW
Wind 24,714 MW
The energy-side block looks fairly neutral. Low capacity bids here are more likely to be about optionality and portfolio structure than an obvious weather signal.
Low-bid hypotheses
Why might capacity clear very cheaply here?
Cheap reservation can still be rational on the upward side
medium confidenceA provider can bid low capacity prices to secure a reservation payment while still valuing the separate activation-energy leg, especially if expected activation is limited or if the asset is already physically online.
Weather-synchronised portfolios can cheapen one reserve side
low confidenceRenewable-linked portfolios and batteries may naturally prefer one side of the reserve market in weather-driven blocks, pushing the accepted margin lower without implying a general abundance of all flexibility.
Signal basis
How to read the accepted stack
- This page uses actual anonymous reserve publications from Regelleistung, but treats them as awarded-side stack data rather than a full merit-order curve.
- FCR capacity remuneration is pay-as-cleared, while aFRR and mFRR capacity remuneration is pay-as-bid. That pricing-rule split is part of the story, but it is not the same thing as the merit-order logic underneath.
- The public chart accumulates only awarded MW. If a marginal bid was only partly awarded, only the awarded slice is counted in the displayed x-axis.
- The marginal price shown here is the highest accepted visible bid in the published stack for that block.
- The day-ahead bridge is deliberately speculative: it connects reserve blocks to energy-side conditions to suggest why some capacity might clear cheaply, not to identify specific participants.
Caveats
What this does not show
Official Regelleistung documentation says the anonymous offers are published only up to the awarded amount. You cannot infer full rejected-tail book depth from this surface.
On current Regelleistung documentation in March 2026, FCR is a symmetric capacity product with pay-as-cleared remuneration, while aFRR and mFRR capacity remain pay-as-bid four-hour slices.
Anonymous bids still hide participant identity, portfolio strategy, and technology class. Country tags are not the same thing as asset attribution.
A high marginal price is real, but a narrow visible stack does not by itself prove system shortage because the hidden rejected tail may still be substantial.
Next stops
Go deeper from here
The Curves Behind the Price of Power
Guided background on the policy debate, auction rules, and how to read this explorer.
Market Coordination
Use the reserve, day-ahead, and swap surfaces together rather than treating reserve pricing in isolation.
DA Reconstruction
Compare the accepted reserve stack with the open-data benchmark of day-ahead price formation.
DA Swap
Follow the day-ahead shape layer through the realized swap framework.